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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
v. 
RAYMOND DEHERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 960300-CA 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AND JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for burglary, a second-degree felony, claiming 
that his trial counsel was ineffective. This Court has jurisdiction of second-degree 
felony appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996). 
ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARDS 
1. Has defendant shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial 
would have been more favorable had counsel called an expert witness to show that 
defendant was not in the house when shot? Because this case is on review from a rule 
23B hearing, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact. State v. Huggins, 
920 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah App. 1996). This Court, however, makes the final legal 
conclusion about ineffectiveness de novo. Id. 
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2. When defendant gives one paragraph to his claim that trial counsel's 
eyesight hindered his defense and that paragraph includes no legal analysis or citation, 
has he waived his right to appellate review by failing to adequately brief the issue? 
This matter was not before the trial court. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or 
theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
A jury convicted defendant of burglary, a second-degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1996) (R. 82). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to the statutory indeterminate prison term of l-to-15 years (R. 87). After 
filing a timely notice of appeal, defendant requested a remand under rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to obtain facts regarding trial counsel's effectiveness and 
whether trial counsel's eyesight hindered his ability to provide a constitutionally 
adequate defense (R. 332). The trial court held the remand hearing on March 24, 1997 
and subsequently issued Findings of Fact (R. 341-342; 346-350). 
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Statement of Facts 
THE BURGLARY 
Awakened from her sleep at 7:00 a.m. by persistent ringing of the doorbell, 
Jocelyn Struhs asked her 71-year old husband, Kenneth, to go downstairs and see what 
was wrong (R. 211). Walking with a crutch because of recent arthroscopic surgery on 
his knee, Mr. Struhs got to the head of the stairs when the doorbell stopped and he 
began hearing a loud banging on the back door (id.). Because of the violent nature of 
the banging, he thought someone was trying to break in so he went to get his .22 
semiautomatic rifle (R. 213). About the same time that he picked up the rifle, he heard 
the two-inch thick, solid oak door crash down (id.). He walked into the kitchen and 
saw defendant and another man come in through the door toward him (R. 214). Mr. 
Struhs yelled to his wife to call 911, which she did (R. 244). As she was talking to 
dispatch, she looked into the kitchen and saw defendant coming toward her husband (R. 
244-45). 
Defendant was approaching Mr. Struhs, though possibly in a slightly sideways 
direction, "very rapidly, faster than a fast walk" with his hands out in front of him "in a 
grasping mode" (R. 215; 238). Though defendant saw Mr. Struhs' rifle and said 
"[d]on't shoot," he kept coming anyway (id.). Despite his fear, Mr. Struhs "just 
couldn't pull the trigger in [defendant's] face," so he lowered the gun and fired at 
defendant's leg (R. 216). Defendant then turned around, said "you shot me" and tried 
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to start out the door (R. 217). Even though Mr. Struhs told him to stop and get down 
on the floor, defendant did not do so until he got out onto the patio (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant claimed that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance because he failed to hire an expert witness to testify that 
he was not in the house when shot. At the rule 23B hearing, the expert witness hired 
specifically for the hearing was unable to say that defendant could never have been 
inside the house. Because the expert's testimony did not contradict the victims' 
testimony that defendant was in the house, the jury would have had no reason to 
disregard the victims' testimony. Consequently, an expert, even if he had testified at 
trial, would have presented no information of such significance to make it reasonably 
probable that a different result would have happened. 
Failure to present suficient argument. Defendant's Point Two does not 
comply with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. It does not include any legal 
citation nor does it relate the evidence from the trial or the remand hearing to the 
operative law. Therefore, it should not be reviewed on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
L TRIAL COUNSEL'S CHOICE NOT TO HIRE AN 
EXPERT WAS A LEGITIMATE TRIAL STRATEGY 
AND THE EXPERT TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT 
THE RULE 23B HEARING SHOWED THAT AN 
EXPERT WOULD NOT HAVE MADE A MORE 
FAVORABLE VERDICT LIKELY. 
Defendant claims trial counsel gave him constitutionally inadequate 
representation because he did not hire an expert witness to show that defendant was not 
in the house when shot. To permit defendant an opportunity to bolster this claim, this 
Court remanded for a hearing via which the trial court could hear evidence about trial 
counsel's preparation and execution of the case. 
To establish that trial counsel provided ineffective representation, defendant must 
show (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard 
of reasonableness; and (2) but for this deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ; see also State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). 
Essential to a correct application of Strickland is recognizing the effect of the 
Court's "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
Strickland added a sub-definition to this definition when it stated that a "reasonable 
probability" is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome/ Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694 (1984). In a shorthand version, the second standard is also referred to as the "prejudice" prong. 
State's counsel chooses not to use this shorthand because the definitional statement better expresses the 
defendant's heavy burden. 
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reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This presumption is 
probably at its strongest when a defendant retrospectively attacks counsel's choice of 
trial strategy. Id.; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993) ("[I]f the 
challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, we will not find 
that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel."); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465-66 
(Utah App. 1993) ("[T]his court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate 
strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect."). 
The trial court's findings show that counsel's not using an expert witness was a 
conscious, legitimate strategy. 
After discussing the case with his client, an expert in 
firearms, and other attorneys, and reviewing all the 
evidence, Mr. Gordon decided that retaining an expert for 
the trial was not necessary because the defendant's case 
could be made in other ways, such as by cross-examination. 
He decided that an expert was not of ultimate importance. 
(R. 348). Though defendant asserts that the findings are wrong, he does not marshal 
the evidence necessary to support that assertion. When a party fails to challenge a 
factual finding and marshal the evidence in support of that finding, this Court "assumes 
that the record supports the findings of the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 
198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam) (citing Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985)). 
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Nevertheless, even assuming that trial counsel should have hired an expert and 
had him testify, the evidence adduced from the rule 23B hearing further shows that the 
testimony would have had no probable influence on the trial. 
In any event, Mr. Johnston [the expert witness] could 
not say that, based on his test results, defendant could not 
have been in the house. At most, Mr. Johnston's testimony 
would change the victim, Mr. Struh's, location in the house. 
Therefore, even if the expert's testimony was correct, it is 
not inconsistent with either Mr. or Mrs. Struh's testimony 
that defendant was in the house when shot. Further, it does 
not undercut the essential element of burglary, i.e., that 
defendant illegally entered into or remained unlawfully in 
the Struhs' home. 
(R. 349; attached as addendum). 
Defendant was charged with burglary, i.e., entering a dwelling with the intent to 
commit a felony, theft, or assault. To commit this crime, it is not necessary that a 
person stay in a dwelling for a certain period of time. It is sufficient merely that he has 
entered a house for any period of time. See State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965, 968-970 
(Utah App. 1994).2 Thus, even with the expert's opinion, i.e., that Mr. Struhs' was 
not in the position he claimed to be in when he shot defendant, the jury had sufficient 
evidence for its verdict. The expert's testimony was not of such significance that it 
Interestingly, defendant's approach in this case is surprisingly similar to the attempt in 
Peterson to show, via expert witness, that Peterson's accomplice could not have entered the home. 
Peterson's argument was that "the police report, the location of J.J.'s body, the testimony of one 
expert who testified as to where one should expect to find blood if J.J. was shot in the house ... 
combine to raise enough doubt as to the element of entry." Peterson, 881 P.2d at 969. This Court 
disagreed and ruled that there was sufficient evidence of an entry, based on the victim's testimony, so 
as not to warrant a lesser-included offense. Id. 
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created a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Consequently, it does not meet the deficiency prong in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). 
II. DEFENDANT PROVIDES NO LEGAL ANALYSIS OR 
ARGUMENT FOR HIS CLAIM THAT TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S EYESIGHT HINDERED 
REPRESENTATION; THEREFORE, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REFUSE TO REVIEW IT. 
Defendant gives one paragraph to his contention that trial counsel's poor 
eyesight prevented him from providing a constitutionally adequate defense.3 This 
paragraph does not include any legal citation nor does it discuss any of the evidence 
found at the remand hearing. Due to this lack of analysis, the Court should refuse to 
review the issue on appeal. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992); 
English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah App. 1991) ("the 
assertive analysis is not meaningful"). 
3
 In actuality, the trial court in its findings, which defendant does not challenge on 
appeal, found that defendant had poor eyesight but was "able to see exhibits, diagrams, and witnesses' 
and that the "trial court and the prosecutor allowed Mr. Gordon to view these exhibits in a manner that 
facilitated his ability to see them." Again, though he asserts this factual finding is wrong, defendant 
nowhere marshals the evidence in support of that proposition. Consequently, this Court can assume the 
accuracy of the finding. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). (R. 347). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J/)_ November 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENEI 
[ES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
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mSSSS=S=SSSS==S=S==SS=S====S==SSSSSS=SS=SSSSSBSSBBSSSSSS=Sa==Z 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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Defendant/Appellant. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT FROM 
RULE 23B HEARING 
Case No. 951901284 FS 
Appellate Case No. 960300-CA 
After a jury found defendant guilty of burglary, a second-degree felony, he filed 
an appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. During that appeal, defendant requested a 
remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, insisting that his trial 
counsel, Victor Gordon, provided him ineffective assistance. Defendant specifically 
claimed that counsel acted deficiently in two ways: (1) by failing to get an expert 
witness to testify about ballistics and trajectory; and (2) representing him while under a 
visualiiisability that prevented him from seeing sufficiently to operate in a courtroom. 
STfe-appellate court granted the remand request on those two issues and the trial court 
"wrf Ju<?iaa! District 
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COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
'scheduled an evidentiary hearing, which was held on March 24, 1997. Benjamin A. 
Hamilton represented defendant; James H. Beadles, assistant attorney general, 
represented the State. Defendant, Victor Gordon, and William Johnston, an individual 
purporting to be an expert in ballistics, testified. The court makes the following factual 
findings. 
1. Victor Gordon met with defendant twelve times to discuss his case and 
talked with him twice over the telephone. 
2. Mr. Gordon has practiced criminal law for six years. Before trying 
defendant's case, he had represented at least two defendants in burglary cases. 
3. Mr. Gordon is legally blind in his left eye due to a condition called 
keritakoma. In October 1995, his right eye was operated on and his cornea was 
removed and replaced with an artificial cornea. 
4. When the trial occurred in January 1996, Mr. Gordon had fully recovered 
from this operation. However, due to the condition in his left eye, he had to wear 
sunglasses to keep out bright lights. 
5. Mr. Gordon was able to see exhibits, diagrams, and witnesses, although 
he had to place them within inches of his face to see them. 
6. The trial court and the prosecutor allowed Mr. Gordon to view these 
exhibits in a manner that facilitated his ability to see them. 
7. Mr. Gordon twice went to the house where the crime was committed. 
2 
0 0 0 3 4 7 
8. In preparing his case, Mr. Gordon spoke with other attorneys and an 
expert in firearms about ballistics and trajectory. 
9. Mr. Gordon also saw pictures of the crime scene before the trial. 
10. After discussing the case with his client, an expert in firearms, and other 
attorneys, and reviewing all the evidence, Mr. Gordon decided that retaining an expert 
for the trial was not necessary because the defendant's case could be made in other 
ways, such as by cross-examination. He decided that an expert was not of ultimate 
importance. 
11. Defendant did not testify at the trial. 
12. At the rule 23B hearing, defendant testified, but never recounted what 
information he provided Mr. Gordon that would have made a reasonably prudent 
attorney believe an expert was necessary to provide an adequate defense. 
13. William Johnston testified as an expert for the defendant. At defendant's 
request, he made 14 test firings of the gun in an attempt to plot the probable trajectory 
of the casing. However, he admitted that he had not read the trial transcript, viewed 
the scene of the crime, or interviewed the victim, Kenneth Struhs. Therefore, Mr. 
Johnston could not say if the casing had been inadvertently moved between the shooting 
and the preparation of the crime scene, whether the condition of the gun had changed 
since the incident. Because he had not read the trial transcript, he could not relate his 
test firings to the particularities of Mr. Struhs' testimony about his position in the 
3 
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house. Due to these omissions, the trial court believes Mr. Johnson's testimony and 
opinions are not credible. 
14. In any event, Mr. Johnston could not say that, based on his test results, 
defendant could not have been in the house. At most, Mr. Johnston's testimony would 
change the victim, Mr. Struh's, location in the house. Therefore, even if the expert's 
testimony was correct, it is not inconsistent with either Mr. or Mrs. Struh's testimony 
that defendant was in the house when shot. Further, it does not undercut the essential 
element of burglary, i.e., that defendant illegally entered into or remained unlawfully in 
the Struh's home. 
14. The trial court also believes defendant's testimony is self-serving and, 
therefore, not credible. 
Approved as to Form 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
Counsel for Defendant 
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